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Abstract
This paper questions to what extent particular calculative
practices used for inter-organisational decision-making
help or hinder boundary spanners meet performativity
ideals. It uses programmatic rationalities of government as a
framework to study reciprocity between them and the con-
ditions of performativity. Empirical datawere collected from
healthcare commissioning spaces of English National Health
Service (NHS).Data triangulationwas achieved throughdoc-
umentary analysis, data collected through interviews, and
observation notes taken in local commissioning meetings
and national conferences. Findings revealed an appar-
ent lack of reciprocity between programmatic rationality
and calculative practices surrounding the commissioning
activities of boundary spanners. As a consequence, in local
commissioning situations boundary spanners with formal
roles used calculative practices differently than semi-formal
boundary spanners. Unlike their formal counterparts, who
used mainly accounting information in their calculative
practices, semi-formal boundary spanners incorporated
non-accounting information and devised alternative calcu-
lative practices. In addition, while formal boundary spanners
on NHS Committees used calculative practices in maintain-
ing clear boundaries between commissioning and provider
organisations, semi-formal boundary spanners made use of
the data of both parties in order to reach inter organisational
decisions. The study has three main contributions. First, it
differentiates boundary spanners and explains differences
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in their interaction with calculative practices. Second, it
introduces the concept of reciprocity to inter-organisational
studies in accounting. Third, it shows how conditions of
performativity reflected in micro-settings influenced how
semi-formal boundary spanners used calculative prac-
tices (and other supplementary information) to achieve
performance ideals of government programmes.
KEYWORDS
boundary spanners, calculative practices, commissioning, health-
care, inter-organisational, decision-making
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on two prominent features that characterise contemporary public sector management. These are
inter-organisational decision-makingwhere two ormore organisations enter into dialogue and negotiation (Anderson
&Dekker, 2014; Anderson & Sedatole, 2003; Dekker, 2016) and the ‘calculative practices’ of new public management
(Kurunmaki, Mennicken, &Miller, 2016; Lapsley &Miller, 2019; Miller, 2001; Steccolini, 2019) for managing and con-
trolling public sector organisations (Lapsley, 2008). Inter-organisational relations and inter-organisational decision-
making (hereafter IODM) are not only pertinent to the public sector but also contemporary management accounting
research in various contexts and organisational settings (Anderson et al., 2015; Dekker, 2004). Within the literature,
there is agreement about the importanceof individuals and theneed to study them further so that inter-organisational
decision-making processes and the way management accounting is implicated in such processes can be better under-
stood (Abernethy, Bouwens, & van Lent, 2004; Anderson et al., 2015).
In the literature, ‘boundary spanners’ are defined individuals who are responsible for management and decision-
making between two or more organisations (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Boundary spanners have distinctive
roles and a range of responsibilities in inter-organisational spaces and face the challenge of meeting the multiple
expectations of partner organisations. The aforementioned literature is limited in its documentation for public sec-
tor organisations how the attributes of calculative practices (Miller, 2001) help and/or hinder boundary spanners in
delivering outcomes that are in line with the expectations (defined by government programmes and policies) of their
organisations. In previous studies of calculative practices, researchers use the performativity principle to explain how
individuals are shapedby these practices (Kurunmaki et al., 2016).However, it is notwell known fromempirical studies
whether and how these individuals have any influence on shaping calculative practices to meet performativity ideals
when two or more organisations interact. Therefore, the main research question in this study is how boundary span-
ners use (and influence the use of) calculative practices in IODM to achieve performativity ideals defined by govern-
ment programmes.
Additionally, in studies of calculative practices there is an underlying assumption of reciprocity (Rose & Miller,
1992). Reciprocity in this context is defined as having in place relevant and adequate calculative practices that are
at the disposal of individuals in order to meet performativity ideals. In other words, reciprocity indicates that calcula-
tive practices serve tomeet the performativity ideals of government programmes.What is not clear iswhat individuals
do if the calculative practices that are in place are not adequate to achieve performativity ideals. Inter-organisational
spaces offer a fertile field of study wheremultiple calculative practices and accounting technologies are at play simul-
taneously and different organisations might have different priorities and diverging expectations. As a consequence
existing calculative practices might not always be adequate to address the needs of one or both parties involved. This
GUVEN-USLU ET AL. 3
paper studies such instances where current calculative practices are not always deemed to be adequate by boundary
spanners tomeet performativity ideals in inter-organisational spaces within the public sector.
Our research setting and empirical context for the paper is the English National Health Service (NHS) follow-
ing the changes introduced by the 2010 White Paper and the 2012 Social Care Act legislation. These two doc-
uments explain how commissioning of healthcare in the NHS changed both in terms of its organisational struc-
ture and in the roles of professionals who are in charge of the commissioning practice. In this emerging structure,
commissioning of health services takes place in an inter-organisational space where new purchaser organisations
called clinical commissioning groups (hereafter CCGs) and provider organisations like hospitals and general prac-
tice Surgeries (hereafter GP surgeries) interact to make decisions about healthcare delivery to the nation and enter
into legally binding contracts. The study focuses on the use of calculative practices in negotiations and decision-
making between these organisations undertaken by various types of boundary spanners (including managers, clin-
icians and accountants) and the effect of this on the perceptions and actions of boundary spanners with regard
to commissioning.
Primary datawere collected fromsemi-structured interviewswith 19boundary spanners employedby12different
organisations representing both the purchasing and provisioning sides of healthcare commissioning and observation
notes were taken at four local commissioningmeetings and at twoNHS and CCG commissioning conferences.
Our study contributes to the current literature in the following three ways. First, as indicated in our findings, we
identified two sets of boundary spanners: formal and semi-formal. As their name indicates, the former group was for-
mally appointed boundary spanners representing their organisations at inter-organisational committees (called local
commissioning committees) between representatives of local CCGs and hospitals. The latter group was present at
local committee meetings; although they were not formally appointed to their role and their involvement was mostly
voluntary, these semi-formal boundary spanners were highly influential in IODM in the situations that we studied.
Second, we propose introducing the concept of ‘reciprocity’ to IODM studies. Our findings implied that
different IODM circumstances required a reciprocal set of calculative practices or a reciprocal approach of
using existing calculative practices in order to meet the expectations of different organisations. The evidence
we present shows that when reciprocity is not present difficulties arise achieving the desired outcomes of
all organisations involved in decision-making. A lack of reciprocity could also have an adverse impact on
decision-making processes, causing a lack of consistency, decreasing involvement and a lowering of trust among
boundary spanners.
Third, we contribute to current studies of performativity by giving examples of how conditions of performativity
influencemicro-settings and individuals in making decisions.We describe the conditions of performativity with refer-
ence to calculative practices (financial and management accounting practices) and confirm findings of recent studies
on howperformativity ideals govern boundary spanners (in particular formal boundary spanners) as calculable objects
(Kurunmaki et al., 2016). As a contribution to this debate, the evidence showed thatwhen the existing set of calculative
practices was not adequate, influential semi-formal boundary spanners were able to suggest modifications to existing
practices and convince other semi-formal and formal boundary spanners to use them in IODM.With this evidence, we
argue that boundary spanners as calculable objects adhere to the conditions of performativity but they are at the same
time able to suggest alternative calculative practices and amend them accordingly in order tomeet the performativity
ideals of their organisation (while recognizing performance expectations of other organisations involved in IODM).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we begin by giving an overview of the relevant stud-
ies in IODM. Then the study background is presented in terms of changes taking place in commissioning pro-
grammes and policies with reference to relevant accounting practices. Theoretical expectations of the study are
then explained in terms of ‘calculative practices’ and ‘conditionality of performativity’. An explanation of method-
ology, data collection and analysis is followed by study findings, and the paper ends with concluding comments
and discussion.
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2 ‘IODM’ IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING STUDIES
There is a growing interest in accounting research for better understanding of inter-organisational management
accounting and control practices (Anderson & Dekker, 2014; Anderson & Sedatole, 2003; Dekker, 2016). Recent
reviews of this literature indicate that management accounting research appears to have neglected the role of man-
agers and employees assigned to take active roles in inter-organisational decision-making activities (Dekker, 2016, p.
87). These boundary spanner roles are a crucial aspect of success in inter-organisational alliances (Taylor, 2005), yet
the individuals in them are expected to serve the interests of multiple organisations which have varied (and at times
conflicting) interests. Research evidence in management accounting is limited in the area of examining the behaviour
of boundary spanners in influencing (and being influenced by) inter-organisational relationships and their dynamics.
2.1 Inter-organisational spaces and role of boundary spanners in public sector studies
Thomasson (2018) distinguishes between governance and managerial levels of integration with respect to the use of
IODM. In studying public sector mergers as an example of such a situation, the study revealed there were additional
boundaries, such as financial, administrative, legal and geographical. In different mergers that have been studied, dif-
ferent forms of boundaries were observed indicating the differing nature of inter-organisational work and boundary
spanner responsibilities.
Despite theproliferationof boundaries, other researchon inter-organisational spaces of thepublic sector indicated
that usually one particular group of actors interacted more intensively than others as a result of their dependency on
delivering public-integrated services (Agranoff &McGuire, 2001;Mandell 2001;Milward & Provan, 2000).
Another study by Noble and Jones (2006) looked at the roles and behaviours of boundary spanners in voluntary
partnerships between private and public sector organisations. The research confirms previous literature findings in
describing the challenges of inter-organisational spaces and defines a four-stage evolutionary process with one or
two challenges at each stage. It is evident that the process of inter-organisational work is challenging and boundary
spanners employ various strategies to overcome such challenges even when inter-organisational work is voluntary
and not mandatory.
In public sector management literature, the inter-organisational field is sometimes described as a self-sustaining
system (Klijn, 2008) in which very little cooperation exists and which is dominated by ‘institutionalised thought struc-
tures’ (Warren, Bergunder, Newton, &Rose, 1974). Public sector entities have clear organisational domains that result
in frequent domain conflicts between partner organisations when they have to cooperate (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer,
1981;Warren et al., 1974).
In the case of commissioning and contractual agreement in NHS, previous research confirmed that there is an
apparent tension between maintaining cost efficiency and improving service delivery. For example, in their recent
study of this context Chambers et al. (2013) showed that the need to tender service delivery to acquire and maintain
incentives for cost efficiency aswell as the need to promote interaction and learning processes between organisations
to improve service delivery was creating long-standing tensions.
The studies above indicate that inter-organisational spaces in the public sector (and in commissioning in NHS) are
complex and include domain conflicts between organisations. Furthermore, inmore complex inter-organisational situ-
ations (suchasmergers in thepublic sector), there is thepossibility of aproliferationofboundary spannersdealingwith
various dimensions of inter-organisational relations. Despite this proliferation, there is evidence showing that partic-
ular groups of actors appear to play a more critical role than others in inter-organisational spaces. It is also evident
in these studies that inter-organisational relations have an evolutionary characteristic and they tend to go through
stages of evolution and a different set of challenges at every stage.
GUVEN-USLU ET AL. 5
According to the aforementioned studies, although the role of boundary spanners in inter-organisational spheres is
widely accepted, the limits of boundary spanning activities of individuals in relation to their use of accounting are not
clear. It is therefore not evident how boundary spanners use (and influence the use of) calculative practices in IODM
to achieve performativity ideals defined by government programmes.
3 NHS COMMISSIONING: PROVIDERS AND COMMISSIONERS OF HEALTH CARE
IN ENGLAND
The purpose of this section is to provide the study background in terms of changes taking place in English NHS com-
missioning programmes and policies with reference to relevant accounting practices.
Commissioning is a complex and dynamic process involving strategic planning, purchasing, contracting and mon-
itoring of health services to meet the needs of the local population. Commissioning was introduced in the NHS fol-
lowing the creation of the internal market at the beginning of the 1990s. An internal market is a quasi-market pred-
icated on the presence of competition (just like in the private sector) but within the scope of the tax-funded NHS.
This development was influenced by the government’s desire to extend New Public Management (NPM) reforms
(informed by market, governance and accounting logics) to healthcare delivery (Jackson, Paterson, Pong, & Scarparo,
2014).
On 1 April 2013, the ‘old’ system of commissioning NHS services changed fundamentally: the old commissioners in
the form of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) ceased to exist. The rationale for this
was that ‘layers of excessive bureaucracy’ and red tape could be slashed so that frontline medical professionals could
structure services aroundwhatworks best for patients (Asthana, 2011, p. 816). The abolition of the old commissioning
systemwasmeant to reduce NHSmanagement costs by about 45% (DoH, 2010). The responsibility and resources for
commissioning hospital and other care1 passed fromPCTs and SHAs to 211CCGs – the new commissioners. CCGs are
comprisedmostly of representatives from local GP surgeries, but also nurses, allied health professionals, pharmacists,
other healthcare professionals and managers.2 (Specialised and primary care are commissioned at a national level by
NHS England, the former NHSCommissioning Board.)
CCGs became an essential part of the latest model of commissioning introduced by the coalition government
of 2010. The leadership of CCGs is shared between an accountable officer (a GP or a manager) and a chair (a
clinician or a non-clinician). The accountable officer is responsible for ensuring that the CCG fulfils its duties to
exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically, thus ensuring improvement in the quality of ser-
vices and the health of the local population whilst maintaining value for money. The chair supports CCG mem-
bers as they make plans and decisions on the commissioning of healthcare whilst delivering the best possible use
of public funds. According to 2017 figures, altogether 207 (this number changes as a result of continuous mergers
between CCGs) CCGs in England are now annually handling £75.2 billion, which is two-thirds of the total NHS budget
(NHS, 2017).
In addition to their governing committee, each CCG has a number of other committees. Some of those com-
mittees are established for local commissioning purposes, such as joint clinical committee where there are rep-
resentatives from CCG, hospitals, social services, local government to make joint strategic decisions for their
region.
Onemajor difference between CCGs and previous commissioning bodies is the way budgets are prepared. In CCG
commissioning, budgets are real rather than indicative (Department of Health, 2012). This is worth noting since it
1 CCGs currently commission: community health services, maternity services, elective hospital care, urgent and emergency care, including ambulance and
out-of-hours services, older people’s healthcare, children’s healthcare, rehabilitation, mental healthcare, healthcare services for people with learning disabil-
ities, continuing healthcare, infertility services, among others.
2 When the recent reforms were first proposed, CCGs used to be called GP-led consortia. This name was later changed to CCGs, following advice from the
NHS Future Forum 2011, to reflect the fact that professionals other than just GPs, such as nurses, are also part of these consortia (Storey &Grint, 2012).
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means that financial resources are allocated to CCGs based on actual quantities of services provided as opposed to
previous initiatives where financial resources were allocated based on historical lump sum amounts (NHS, 2017). In
the same fashion, CCGs can allocate financial resources to providers and commission services based on actual quan-
tities required, not on indicative or estimated quantities. These accounting structures in CCGs call for a partnership
between local GPs and senior commissioningmanagers.
4 CALCULATIVE PRACTICES AND CONDITIONALITY OF PERFORMATIVITY
Our theoretical expectation was built on the work of Rose andMiller (1992) who argued that programmatic or politi-
cal rationalities of government are made operable through relevant technologies of accounting. They call these tech-
nologies ‘calculative practices’ or ‘technologies of government’ (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 183). These are the financial
mechanisms through which programmes of government are articulated and made operable. Through these practices,
attention is directed at how financial information shapes social and economic relations.
The calculative practices referred to in this study included a variety of actions such as the calculation of budgeted
and actual income and costs, identifying deviations from standard costs and planned volumes of activity, comparison
of budget figures to actual results, setting transfer prices for transferring funds between government agencies and
so on. Management accounting offers a wide range of tools with which to manage an organisation as an enterprise
and to act upon individuals and subunits as standardised entities (Miller, 2001). Calculative practices are technologies
through which conceptions of proper modes of governing persons and populations are elaborated. There is therefore
a reciprocal relation between calculative practices and the social relations they form and seek tomanage (Miller, 2001).
Government – as a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures and through different forces – seeks to render
programmes operable. Rose and Miller (1992) argue that programmatic or political rationalities of government are
made operable through reciprocity between programmatic ideals and calculative practices. Theoretically, the study
therefore aims to unpack (in the first part of Empirical findings section below) the reciprocity between the studied
commissioning legislation and the calculative practices that governed commissioning in order to make legislative
changes operable.
According to thedefinitionof technologies of government, a set of calculative practiceswouldbe in place as amech-
anism throughwhich government programmeswould be articulated andmadeoperable. Hence, the expectation of the
study is to find new accounting practices that are in line with the government programme. This expectation informs
other analyses and Empirical findings of the study.
Another concept associated with calculative practices is ‘calculable objects’. Through various accounting technolo-
gies, the actions of individuals and groups of individuals (and organisations) can be recorded and controlled. In this
way, calculative practices render individuals as calculable objects. We bring the concept of performativity formulated
byCallon (1986) to our theoretical framework of calculative practices. Performativity is generally described as a novel
and powerful account of how calculative devices shape economic actors and markets. It privileges the role of calcula-
tive devices over established social relations and norms, ignoring organisational political and institutional contexts. In
the second part of the findings, we define conditions of performativity for the organisations we studied and explain
how formal boundary spanners engage with calculative practices and display characteristics of calculable objects.
According to Kurunmaki et al. (2016), numbers that can be expressed in economic or financial terms have come to be
endowedwith a ‘formof truth’ that have the authority to guide, govern, shape and influence the individuals and society.
Calculative practices therefore have the potential to govern and shape boundary spanners as calculable objects.
In recent accounts of performativity, twomain areas identified for further study are (a) the influence ofmicro-level
interrelationships in performativity and (b) the role of individuals in shaping calculative devices (Beunza & Ferraro,
2019). To consider both of these neglected aspects of performativity, in this paper we frame our theoretical expecta-
tion as follows. Calculative practices in the public sector studied in this context are designed centrally andmade oper-
able through government programmes and technologies. As stated above, these calculative practicesmake individuals
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and their actions calculable, turning them into calculable objects (Kurunmaki et al., 2016). As per performativity ideals,
these calculative devices therefore have ultimate power over individuals andmarkets shaping them accordingly.
Detailed and intricate relationships at themicro-level taking place between calculable objects and calculative prac-
tices is the empirical focus of the third part of the findings section. The attitudes of semi-formal boundary spanners
and situations studied provide evidence of conditions under which some of these individuals use calculative practices
to generate new possibilities devised to meet the performativity and quantification ideals of NPM (Kurunmaki et al.,
2016). Later in the Discussion section, we turn to these three theoretical aspects of our study and elaborate on our
conclusions.
5 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data collection consisted of three stages.Our aim in Stage 1was to understand howdecisions for commissioningwere
made between boundary spanners and how they used calculative practices in decision-making between providers and
commissioners. To that end, Stage 1 consisted of introductory interviews, observation in local meetings and collec-
tion of relevant documents. Introductory interviews (see Table 1 for a list of interviewees) were with senior managers
(interviews 1 and 4 in Table 1) from two large hospitals (Hospitals A and B). These were followed by observations at
commissioning meetings between representatives of Hospitals A and B and local Commissioning Groups A and B (see
Table 2 regarding content andmembership ofmeetings observed). In addition to primary data, we collected documen-
tary evidence for local Clinical Commissioning Committees. These committees were bodies responsible for commis-
sioning of GP services. On these committees, there were representatives fromGP surgeries, large acute hospitals, lay
members as well as senior managers and/or GPs appointed by the CCG.
At Stage 2, we attended National Commissioning Conferences to collect observation data and documentary evi-
dence in relation to calculative practices and to observe activities, workshops, etc., involving calculative practices, to
collect data about the level of awareness and general approach towards relevant accounting technologies at a national
level. At the conferences, we also distributed a leaflet about our study to more than 200 delegates and asked them if
they would be willing to participate as an interviewee if they believed that they met our definition of ‘boundary span-
ner in commissioning’.
In Stage 3, we conducted further interviews with boundary spanners from different parts of the country and the
Director of Financial Strategy of the NHSCommissioning Board.
These were 12 interviewees (see Interviewees 8–19 in Table 1) who accepted our invitation at Stage 2. Our aim
was to ask if these interviewees had similar or different experiences to those that we observed in Stage 1 and explore
if there were any other issues affecting their perceptions and decision-making when they use calculative practices in
commissioning.
In addition to interviews, observation data collected during the fieldwork, and commissioning documents collected
from clinical commissioning committees, we used policy documents as another source of data. Thisway it was possible
to use a data triangulation approach in the study between interview transcripts, observation notes and documentary
analysis. Themain policy documents usedwere theDepartment ofHealth’sWhite Paper of 2010 Equity and Excellence:
Liberating the NHS (Department of Health 2010) and the Health and Social Care Act (HSCA) of 2012 (HSCA 2012).
Interviewdata sources are summarised in Table 1. In total, 19 boundary spanners from12organisationswere inter-
viewed. These organisations included three hospitals, two GP surgeries and seven NHS CCGs. All interviewees were
actively involved in inter-organisational commissioning decision-making and had different professional backgrounds
as clinicians, managers and accountants. Some of these intervieweeswere also observed at local commissioningmeet-
ings (notedwith an asterisk in Table 2). These interviewswere complementedwith two sets of observation notes taken
during four CCG commissioningmeetings and two national NHS commissioning conferences.
For data analysis, interview transcripts were coded with computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
MAXQDA 10. This software allows the user to highlight text excerpts and assign to them a code by using colours
8 GUVEN-USLU ET AL.
TABLE 1 List of interviewees and their role as boundary spanners
No
Organisation
type
Professional
background
Job title role: Formal or
semi-formal
a
Commissioning-related
responsibilities
1 Hospital A Accountant 1 Director of Finance and
Deputy Chief Executive –
Semi-formal boundary spanner
Head of commissioning team,
attendsmeetings with CCG
2 Hospital A Manager 1 Business Development
Manager – Semi-formal
boundary spanner
Ad hocmember of
commissioningmeetings and
member ofMeeting 1
observed
3 Hospital A Manager 2 Commissioning Specialist –
Semi-formal boundary spanner
Member of commissioning
team andmember of
Meeting 1 andMeeting 3
observed
4 Hospital B Clinician 1 Director of Service
Improvement – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local clinical
commissioning committee
5 Hospital B Manager 3 Director of Commissioning and
Business – Semi-formal
boundary spanner
Member ofMeeting 4
observed, member of
commissioning team
6 Hospital C Clinician 2 Director of Clinical Finance –
Formal boundary spanner
Member of Commissioning
team, executivemember of
local commissioning
committee
7 Hospital C Accountant 2 Chief Financial Officer –
Semi-formal boundary spanner
Member of commissioning
team, regular contributor to
commissioningmeetings
with local commissioning
group
8 GP Surgery A Clinician 3 GP- Commissioning
representative – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
9 GP Surgery B Clinician 4 GP and CCGBoardmember –
dual role (provider and
commissioner) – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
10 CCGA Clinician 5 Head of Public Health and
member of CCG board –
Formal boundary spanner
Member of local Clinical
Commissioning Committee,
member ofMeeting 1
observed
11 CCGA Manager 4 Commissioning specialist –
Semi-formal boundary spanner
Member of local clinical
commissioning committee
andmember ofMeeting 1
andMeeting 3 observed and
attends clinical
commissioning committee
meetings when required
12 CCGB Clinician 6 GP and Accountable Officer –
dual role -provider and CCG
– Formal boundary spanner
Accountable officer for local
commissioning committee
(Continues)
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
No
Organisation
type
Professional
background
Job title role: Formal or
semi-formal
a
Commissioning-related
responsibilities
13 CCGB Clinician 7 CCG commissioning
representative – Formal
boundary spanner
Representative of local
commissioning committee in
Meeting 2 andMeeting 4
observed
14 CCGC Accountant 3 Head of Financial Strategy &
Commissioning - Formal
boundary spanner
Member of various clinical
commissioning committees
15 CCGD Manager 5 Head of Service Development
– Formal boundary spanner
Regular member of
commissioning committees,
attendsmeetings with
providers
16 CCG E Clinician 8 GP and Accountable Officer –
dual role (provider and
commissioner) – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
17 CCG F Accountant 4 Director of Finance – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
18 CCGG Clinician 9 GP and Chair and Clinical Lead
– triple role – Formal
boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
19 CCGH Clinician 10 GP and CCGChair – dual role –
Formal boundary spanner
Member of local
commissioning committee
Note: aSemi-formal boundary spanners are noted in italics.
and code descriptions. The coding was done in two stages (Saldaña, 2013). The first stage involved ‘structural’ coding,
that is coding according to the professional category. The second stage was more detailed and involved ‘descriptive’
coding. After coding but before analysing the interview data (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005), data reduction was per-
formed. This was done with the help of data segment ‘weights’, a tool available in the MAXQDA 10 software. The
higher theweight assigned to a segment of transcribed text during the coding stage, themore likely this particular seg-
ment was to be used in the data presentation section. High weights were assigned to segments which either offered
opinions shared by several interview subjects, or represented a unique, diverse view for that particular professional
group.
6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We group our findings into four subsections. The first subsection explains the boundary spanners of the study and
explains how and why they are defined as formal and semi-formal boundary spanners. In subsections two, three and
four, we follow the theoretical framework explained in Section 4. In the second subsection, we refer to secondary data
to search for reciprocity between calculative practices and commissioning guidelines in policy documents studied. In
the third subsection, we explain the interaction of formal and semi-formal boundary spanners with calculative prac-
tices. The fourth subsection includes evidence from boundary spanners observed in meetings to explain their interac-
tion with calculative practices and how decisions were reached in IODM.
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TABLE 2 Semi-formal boundary spanners at meetings observed
Organisations Meeting 1 Topic: Referrals fromA&E Meeting 3 Topic: Referrals fromA&E
Hospital A Manager 2 – Commissioning specialist
a
Nurse/Manager A –Out of hours manager
Manager 1 – Business development
manager
a
Manager 2 – Commissioning specialist
a
CCGA Manager 4 – Commissioning specialist
a
Clinician 5 –Head of public health team
a
Finance team representative
Manager 4 – Commissioning specialist
a
Public health teammember
Finance team representative
Meeting 2 Topic: Payments for Rehabilitative
care
Meeting 4 Topic: Payments for
Rehabilitative care
Hospital B Manager 3
a
– Director of Commissioning &
Business
Rehabilitative care servicemanager B1
Manager 3
a
– Director of Commissioning
& Business
Rehabilitative care servicemanager B2
CCGB Clinician 7
a
– Commissioning representative
a
Public Health Representative – Clinician
Notes: Meetings 1 and 3 were about a recently emerging issue of about referrals from Accident and Emergency department.
Meetings 2 and 4 were about a long-standing issue about payments for rehabilitative care for elderly patient. All participants
except Clinician 5 and 7were semi-formal boundary spanners. adenotes interviewees whowere present in meetings.
6.1 Who are the boundary spanners and how are they selected?
According to the evidence, there were two broad groups of boundary spanners which we termed ‘formal’ and
‘semi-formal’ boundary spanners. ‘Formal boundary spanners’ were formally appointed to their role in local
commissioning committees, CCGs or national commissioning boards. Local commissioning committees were
inter-organisational bodies with representatives from local CCG, hospitals, local authority representatives and
lay members. The formal boundary spanners who attended these meetings had a range of professional expertise
(managers, clinicians and accountants). Clinicians 1–10 in Table 1 were all formal boundary spanners as they were
appointed to their role either in CCGs or Hospitals B and C to represent their organisation in inter-organisational
decision-making for commissioning. Similarly, Accountant 3 and Manager 5 also were formal boundary span-
ners because they were appointed to their role as committee members of regional or national commissioning
boards.
According to policy documents about the composition of local clinical committees (DoH 2010; HSCA, 2012), there
were not any specific guidelines or requirements for individuals fulfilling this role; instead, leeway was given to each
CCG to decide on their recruitment strategy as they saw fit (HSCA, 2012, Chapter A2, 14N, Section title: Regula-
tions as to governing bodies of clinical commissioning groups). Other organisations appointed their representative
in a similar fashion. This approach to recruitment was perhaps because of the large scale of the NHS, where often a
one-solution-fits-all approach is practically impossible. As a consequence, selection and appointment in commission-
ing committees have been delegated in a dispersed-governance style to individual CCGs.
It was observed and recorded in meetings 2 and 3 that this freedom may have been intentional in policy design
so that commissioners could enjoy the flexibility to meet their local needs and objectives with available resources
and established structures. Nevertheless, at meetings observed at both sites, it was suggested that the policy lee-
way caused differences in opinion, tension, conflict and confusion over commissioning processes. When we asked the
interviewees about what their motivation was to become a formal boundary spanner, the were four main types of
answers: havingworked in previous commissioning bodies (PCTs) in the past, work experience in commissioning teams
of provider organisations, career progression and personal interest.
We call the second group of boundary spanners ‘semi-formal boundary spanners’. These individuals were the
members of meetings that we had observed between CCGs and providers (see Table 2). Although these individu-
als were not formally appointed to their role, they were involved in local decision-making. For example, Managers
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1, 2, and 5, Accountant 2 and Clinician 7 were called into these meetings because of their experience and knowl-
edge about the particular service that was being discussed. Our observation in meetings showed that these semi-
formal boundary spanners were present and active contributors in commissioning negotiations with CCGs. As we
explain later in this section, these boundary spanners referred regularly to calculative practices for commission-
ing in their words and actions. In fact, calculative practices had a significant influence on how the decisions were
made in these meetings or how these individuals suggested alternative calculative practices to resolve financial
problems.
6.2 Reciprocity between commissioning guidelines and calculative practices
In linewith the theoretical expectations explained in Section 4, the transfer of commissioning responsibility fromPCTs
to CCGswasmeant to coincidewith a new funding formula. A new funding formulawould confirm the reciprocity that
we expected to see in this research between government programmes and calculative practices (DoH, 2011). This
new funding formula according to which the new purchasing organisations (CCGs) would have received their budget
allocation was based on person-based resource allocation.3 The new formula was designed to include variations in
the health needs of individuals and populations that each CCG served. However, due to concerns raised by the British
Medical Council about the implications of using a new formula (British Medical Journal, 2013), instead of replacing
the previous Weighted Capital Formulae (DoH, 2011) that was used for PCTs, the old funding formula continued to
be used with a 2.3% uprating. This was the first evidence of the lack of reciprocity that the study had expected to take
place if a new funding formula for CCGs was adapted. In addition to this, although the formula remained largely the
same, the new way of allocating funds to CCGs were not comparable to previous allocations. This was because even
if a CCG covered the same population as its predecessor PCT organisation, each CCG had different commissioning
responsibilities compared to the PCT (House of Commons Debate, 2013, c4w). This additional evidence confirmed
that despite debates at the policy level, therewerenot any specific changes in the funding calculations forCCGs,which
could include a better representation of clinical decisions as described in the policy documents. Accordingly, the fund
allocated toCCGswasa fixedamount calculatedaccording to theplannedhealthcareneedsof thepopulation that they
served. Performativity ideals forCCGs concerning their fundallocationwere tomake sure that health services that the
populationdemandedweredeliveredat required standards, topayprovider organisations (hospitals andGPsurgeries)
for the services that they delivered, and to achieve these ideals within the fixed budget that they were allocated.
On the other hand, the expectation of provider organisations for income generation was not fixed (contrary to the
fixed income of CCGs). Since 2002, the predominant method for transferring funds to providers has been through
the system of Payment by Results (PbR) (DoH, 2002) usually referred to as the ‘tariff prices’. Tariff prices are essen-
tially a price list for thousands of treatments and packages of care which determines howmuch commissioners (CCGs
or previously PCTs) pay providers for each treatment. This is an activity-based tariff system enabling the linking of
health services provided directly to set tariff prices by the DoH based on the national average cost of each treat-
ment. Commissioners pay the providers for the actual activity they carry out. As tariff prices are fixed, competition
between providers therefore focused on the volume of activity, and as a result their income generation is not capped.
With local committee commissioning, the tariff system remained the same but the prices were cut year after year in
cash terms beginning from the 2011–2012 financial year. This meant that providers were faced with increased finan-
cial challenges and had no alternative but to reduce the cash amount that they spent on each treatment as well as
aim to increase the volume of activity. An increase in activity volume meant that they were able to expect increasing
amounts of funds transfers from commissioners. In other words, whilst providers expected an increasing amount of
income from commissioners, the commissioners had fixed budgets to pay for these services. This disharmony between
3 Initially called the Advisory Committee of Resource Allocation formula (HoC, 2013).
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budget allocations for CCGs and providers was the third evidence of lack of reciprocity between budget calculations
and commissioning ideals described in policy documents.
For providers, performativity criteria were to deliver the care at the standard required and remain within a bal-
anced budget without running a large deficit. This meant that they were expected to deliver the service at or above
required quality but remain at or below centrally determined tariff prices. If theywere able to do this then CCGswere
expected to pay providers at the actual volume of care that they provided. In other words, in terms of financial perfor-
mativity themain aim of CCGswas to keep costs at or below tariff prices.
A third component of commissioning was the Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) (Health and Social Care Infor-
mation Centre, 2012). In order to keep an eye on quality standards, quality targets became stricter with deadlines
for providers to meet them. Commissioners were expected to take quality targets into account when commissioning.
Despite this, there were not any financial implications for hospitals when they met or failed to meet these quality tar-
gets. (Therewere somemarginal financial penalties for GP surgeries if they failed tomeet a limited number of primary
care targets.)
When this change is considered from the perspective of clinician involvement in commissioning with hospitals,
there is no evidence to show reciprocity between these policy ideals and financial processes to support clinicians to
become involved in commissioning. For both PbR (for transfer of funds from commissioners to hospitals) and QOF
(for consideration of quality standards in transferring funds from commissioners to hospitals) accounting technolo-
gies remained largely the same after the new commissioning bodies CCGswere established.
6.3 Boundary spanners and their interaction with calculative practices
In the first subsection, we present data to explain how formal boundary spanners interacted with calculative prac-
tices. We will then turn to semi-formal boundary spanners in the next subsection and explain their interaction with
calculative practices.
6.3.1 Formal boundary spanners and calculative practices
At the national conference, therewas a strong emphasis on the changes that commissioningwas going through, in par-
ticular about how the clinicians as formal boundary spanners were expected to be more involved in decision-making.
To facilitate CCGs that were formally led by clinicians during the process of transition, new advisory units were estab-
lished. These units were regional support and consultancy units that provided the financial and managerial expertise
newly formed CCGswould need to commission services from providers. At the conferences, there were several train-
ing and workshop opportunities for formal boundary spanners with both clinical and managerial responsibilities to
learn about the practical aspects of commissioning as well as informing them about regional support units.
In these sessions, itwas observed that the content includedpolicy documents, centrally defined aims andobjectives
and principles of engagement between providers and purchasers. Theyweremostly presented and discussed at a high
level and regarding broader aspects of commissioning. In relation to the funding formula, it was mentioned in one of
the talks that work was underway to improve the formula used to allocate budget amounts to CCGs. The weighted
personal allowance formula was mentioned as an alternative, but it was explained that further work needed to be
done tomake it work in practice.
As a consequence, our finding above regarding reciprocity was confirmed. The funding of CCGs to a large extent
remained the same as in previous forms of commissioning. This was a first indication for researchers that this
confirmed lack of reciprocity between policy aims and calculative practices could have implications for IODM for
commissioning.
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On the other hand, according to observation notes taken in two workshops and two keynote speeches, the pro-
cess of transferring funds from CCGs to providers was explained in reference to the existing PbRmethodology as the
main practice of allocation of funds. Every time PbR was mentioned, the speakers repeated that local factors were
taken into account and local commissioning teams were considering various aspects of particular services and were
making adjustments to PbR figures when necessary. This was further evidence indicating that local issues that we had
observed in semi-formalmeetings at betweenCCGAandB andHospitals A andBwere not exceptions, and other local
teamsweredealingwith similar issues. This evidence indicated for us that therewas not complete reciprocity between
the calculative practices described in policy documents (balanced budget expectation and meeting quality standards
at the same time) and local practices in some instances. Further refinement of calculative practices to meet the needs
of local settings was deemed to be essential.
In our follow-up interviews after the conference, three formal boundary spanners (Commissioners E,G andH) com-
mented on the information overload. These individuals were all clinicians and hadmultiple roles as both commissioner
and provider. In relation to calculative practices, a high volume and variety of information (costing and activity level)
were available to CCGs. The same interviewees also commented on the difficulty in finding high quality, timely, and
relevant costing and activity information that they could use for decision-making. Several sources provided this type
of information, including NHS England directives with guidelines, policy documents with broad definition of financial
targets (balanced budget and meeting key quality standards), multiple data and reports from the reports of organ-
isations employing the boundary spanners, information from external third parties (such as patient representative
groups) and multiple regulators (such as the Care Quality Commission, the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence, theNHS Trust Development Authority, theDepartment of Health, etc.) with a variety of quality indicators.
The main difficulty according to these interviewees was to be able to sift through and select relevant financial infor-
mation, activity-level data and quality-related information that they could use for optimal IODM, given their limited
time and experience in their new roles.
In relation to the provision of timely and actionable information from provider organisations, the research data
showed that information about the volume of activity in hospitals and number of referrals that the hospitals received
were sometimes 5 or 6months old by the time these data reached the CCGs. As a consequence, the activity data were
outdated and providers were spending time negotiating what needed to be paid for past activities rather than spend-
ing more time planning for current or future activities. This evidence showed that despite legislation (Department of
Health, 2012) indicating that commissioning would be done based on actual figures, in practice commissioning deci-
sions continued to be based on historical data. Commissioners as formal boundary spanners mentioned that projec-
tions were taken into account but again historical data were used tomake some realistic predictions.
There were other challenges that commissioners faced as formal boundary spanners. Clinician 4 explained one sit-
uation as follows:
We put together a business case for a new treatment based on the activity and referral informationwe
had in our practice record. But the CCG rejected this proposal because it was in an unacceptable [i.e.
unfamiliar] format.
The evidence indicated that there were differences in the format of the activity and referral data between the dif-
ferent providers and commissioners. Commissioner G put it this way:
Our [CCG] practice’s own data system does not reconcile to that of the large provider, and their
reported commissioning activity is difficult for our practice to grasp and refer to in making decisions.
Commissioner C (with triple formal commissioning roles) spoke for many in noting that CCG commissioning was
far more challenging than the previous forms of commissioning. He emphasised that an added challenge in IODMwas
the government’s requirements for increased savings on the purchaser side and also shared that the performance
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assessment expectation ofCCGs (HSCA2012§14Z16)was another issue formal boundary spanners had to bemindful
of. Targets for costs and activity levels were imposed on CCGs by NHS England to stay within budgets, and Commis-
sioners E and H perceived these targets as constraining. Some commissioners also felt a lack of fairness in provider-
commissioner negotiations since sometimes a small CCG had to commission services from much bigger entities (e.g.
hospitals) than itself.
The issues noted above turnedout to bewidespreadproblems in inter-organisational communication. This resulted
in someprovider hospitals and their representatives losing interest and thediscontinuationof producing newbusiness
cases. This evidence showed that formal boundary spanners’ work was adversely affected by the lack of synchronici-
ties in the timing of reports as well as the lack of relevant content that the providers were reporting. Their enthusiasm
for taking an active role in IODMwas also curbed.
6.3.2 Summary of findings for formal boundary spanners and calculative practices
One main finding from the analysis of data in relation to formal boundary spanners and interviews that were con-
ducted after national conferences was that there was information overload for formal boundary spanners. It is worth
noting that many of these individuals were usually clinicians with multiple commissioning roles. For example, as indi-
cated in Table 1, Commissioners G and H had dual and triple roles, respectively. As a consequence of this, they were
possibly receiving more information than others who did not have multiple roles. It was challenging in particular
for these individuals to find and use the most relevant financial and performance-related information in different
decision-making settings of commissioning.
In relation to accounting technologies, budget allocations and spending reports were essential pieces of informa-
tion used in committee meetings by formal boundary spanners. One particular aspect of these reports was the dif-
ferences in time periods the reports covered. Providers usually reported historical data, whereas CCGs were making
plans and projections of future activity. As a consequence of this, the volumes of activity reported by providers and
volumes of activity reported by CCGs were not consistent. Although the guidance in the new commissioning policy
documents was to use actual volumes of activity for transfer of funds from CCGs to providers, this was difficult to
achieve in practice. Providers continued to report in the format that was compatible with their existing systems and
relied on historical data, whereas CCGs were expecting to discuss current volumes and future predictions. This evi-
dence led to the conclusion that time periods of accounting reports for volumes and costs of activities were different
in CCGs than in providers. As a consequence, formal boundary spanners found it difficult to understand these reports
and how tomake sense of these different forms of accounting technologies.
Another important issue according to CCGs was the way their performance was being monitored. The expected
volumes of demand and associated costs were planned in CCG budgets when they received their funds. These figures
were fixed and given. In addition to this, in policy guidelines and in their performance targets, CCG were expected
to make some savings. According to formal boundary spanners (Commissioners C and F in particular), this made per-
formance targets of CCGs very demanding and (according to some) almost impossible to meet. Furthermore, some
CCG representatives mentioned that the size of some CCGs as an organisation was significantly smaller than certain
provider organisations that theyworkedwith. This caused concern in particular when sharing of performance-related
data between CCGs and providers as their systemswere significantly different from each other.
6.3.3 Semi-formal boundary spanners and calculative practices
Weobserved semi-formal boundary spanners in meetings 1–4 summarised in Table 2.
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These individualswere fromdifferent backgrounds andweremeeting in order to discuss commissioning issues that
were causing problems between hospitals and CCGs. Below we summarise each situation separately for problems
betweenHospital A and CCGA and then betweenHospital B and CCGB.
Meetings 1 and 3 between semi-formal boundary spanners fromHospital A and CCG A
Payments for increasing volumes of accident and emergency (A&E) referrals to Hospital A had recently become an
important issue in commissioning. According to discussions in Meeting 1 and interview data fromManagers 1 and 2,
the hospital was not receiving sufficient income transfer fromCCGA to pay for some of the A&E referrals. AtMeeting
1, one of the performance measures discussed was the waiting time target for A&E services. This was one of the key
performance indicators of quality for Hospital A andwaswithin expected ranges and therefore did not cause any con-
cerns. On the other hand, the volume of activity reported by Hospital A did not reconcile with the volume of activity
in CCG A records. The large discrepancy was thought to have emerged from actual activity that CCG A expected and
the past activity that Hospital A reported. At the end of Meeting 1, these semi-formal boundary spanners decided to
meet again to discuss the differences in volumes of activity. In Meeting 3, Manager 1 joined Manager 2 and brought
historical records of Hospital A and showed that the volume of activity was increasing year on year. As a consequence,
they were expecting higher income even if the price per activity remained the same. Semi-formal boundary spanners
of CCG A however explained in Meeting 3 that despite an increase in volume, the costs associated with A&E services
inHospital Awere declining (they referred to this as a good sign of efficiency) and theywere currently lower than cen-
trally determined tariff prices. In addition to this, they explained that CCG budget allocation would not allow them to
overspend. As a consequenceof this explanation, semi-formal boundary spanners ofCCGAoffered to pay around10%
less than the prices thatwere centrally determined. However, these semi-formal boundary spanners accepted the vol-
umes of activity presented byHospital A.With this suggestion, the performance targets of bothHospital A andCCGA
were met, but a new set of rules for commissioning between them were devised as a consequence of discussions and
sharing of information between the two groups of semi-formal boundary spanners. One of the managers (4) in CCGA
said the following to explain their position:
. . . We do not have always sufficient funds to pay for all the services we commission. . . . We have to
suggest possible alternatives to providers. . . For example, paying less of a certain percentage and agree
for this to be paid later or carry it forward in the accounts. . .
Although this was not seen as an ideal way of commissioning, the Director of Finance as a semi-formal boundary
spanner fromHospital A commented on the above-described situation as follows:
Wedo not have any other options really. . . Commissioners say there is not sufficient funds . . . they offer
to pay less but will probably pay the remaining 10% at a future date?. . . .There is also now a possibility
for them to commission from private providers. . . It seems like it is inevitable that the commissioners
might choose them. . . in particular if they provide the service at a lower price.
In relation to these types of arrangements between semi-formal boundary spanners, we asked one of the formal
boundary spanners (Accountant 3) to comment. His response was as follows:
At times almost everything other than the finances gets pushed to one side because of the needs to be
met within limited resources . . . We simply cannot pay for everything. . . as there is not enough money
in the organisation to do that.
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Meetings 2 and 4 between semi-formal boundary spanners fromHospital B and CCG
There was an ongoing issue for several years between Hospital B and CCG B about rehabilitative care in terms of
increasing volumes of activity and delayed payments that the hospital received for that service. A series of meetings
wereheldwith anaim to resolve someaspects of this long standing issue.Weobserved twoof thosemeetings3months
apart to record the progress and study use of calculative practices in that process.
InMeeting 2, theDirector of Commissioning and Business fromHospital B explained the problem and howdelayed
payments were affecting the performance of rehabilitative care. In particular, the concern was that delayed payments
were affecting future planning for the service and having an influence on the performance of the team. He explained
that because of the demographics and ageing population in their region, the hospital was providing a large variety and
volume of rehabilitative care. Despite this, they were not able to receive the funds on time and were not able to plan
properly for the future. He also argued that this trend was expected to continue and if payments were not received as
expected then the performance of the hospital would face serious challenges. He asked the CCG clinician representa-
tive for support to work with the CCG so that delayed payments of the past few years would be corrected and a new
payment arrangement would be established in line with the new commissioning structure. Representatives of Hospi-
tal B used accounting information (such as increasing deficit in rehabilitative care services) to argue that the deficit in
rehabilitative care was affecting the overall deficit of Hospital B. In addition to this, they supplied increasing numbers
of bed occupancy for rehabilitative care as well as increasing numbers of patients waiting to be discharged from reha-
bilitative care to show the bottlenecks and difficulties they were facing. In meeting 4, the CCG representative used
public health information to show how they estimated the possible increase in rehabilitative care and explained that
the increase was not at an ‘alarming rate’ and appeared to be steady compared to previous years. In addition to this,
the public health representative brought to the meeting some guideline documents explaining how CCG B received
their income in order to explain to the hospital representative the funding principles of the CCG.
As a consequence, the argument of CCG B at the end of Meeting 4 was to continue to fund rehabilitative care as
they used to. There was not any significant concern according to them in doing this and their practice was in line with
their planning according to public health statistics. The agreement at the end of Meeting 4 was for the CCG to pay
around 20% less than the amount calculated according to the volume of activity in previous years.
A semi-formal boundary spanner (Manager 3) who contributed to commissioning discussions fromHospital B com-
mented on the outcome of meeting 4 as follows:
The support from the new form of commissioning is just enough to keep continuing to how we used to
do things and not enough to bring any serious change.
When asked about the outcomes of local meetings observed, a formal boundary spanner fromHospital B (Clinician
1) commented as follows:
Clinical considerations need to drive the CCGs more than at present. These need to be put in the con-
text of financial constraints, rather than financial constraints entirely dictatingwhat is going to happen.
The above evidence indicated therefore that formal boundary spanners were aware of the challenges that semi-
formal boundary spannerswere facing. Similarly, theGPs fromCCGB felt thatCCGswereboundby a top-down, finan-
cially driven process. A second formal boundary spanner (Clinician 4) again reflected about this situation as follows:
Clinical commissioning is amisnomer. It hasbeen largely basedonmechanics to try and reduce the large
deficits in commissioning.
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6.3.4 Summary of findings for semi-formal boundary spanners and calculative
practices
Local commissioning meetings observed made it clear that each set of meetings were aimed at addressing particular
services that caused concernmainly to provider organisations. A negotiation process took place between semi-formal
boundary spanners from CCGs and providers. In these meetings, a number of different sources of information were
used by semi-formal boundary spanners: activity volumes, costs for groups of activity, qualitative indicators (such as
waiting time targets), management information such as (bed occupancy levels), as well as public health needs data and
demographics. These meetings were spaces where calculative practices of accounting met with other data such as
public health statistics and needs tomake informed decisions.
With accounting information Hospital A was aiming to demonstrate that they were not being paid sufficiently and
this was affecting their performance as there was an upward trend in the volume of A&E patients. On the other hand,
CCG A checked quality indicators and costs of Hospital A and argued that they had met A&E quality targets and also
had costs slightly below national averages. In addition to this, CCG A was asked to make some savings as per their
performance targets. As a consequence, they offered to pay but at a discounted level. In this example, a variety of
accounting technologies and performancemeasures were used to agree on reduced prices for A&E services.
ForHospital B, the issuewas about continued delaying of paymentswhichwere not being realized for several years.
This accumulation was affecting their financial performance. They supported their argument with public health data
that they expected demand to increase and were not willing to continue accepting delaying of payments. However,
this was not accepted by semi-formal boundary spanners of CCG B for two reasons. The first one was that according
to their public health records and predictions, the demand was increasing at a steady pace and as expected. Second,
they explained the way a budget was allocated to CCG based on these predictions. Unless there was a change in the
way they received their budget, there was no reason for them to change the way they were paying for commissioning
this service. Theagreement reachedbetween semi-formal boundary spannerswas to continuewithdelayingpayments
to the following financial year, similar to what they had been doing before.
7 DISCUSSION
As stated in the Introduction, to address the gap in management accounting studies (Anderson et al., 2015) this paper
studies how boundary spanners use (and influence the use of) calculative practices (Miller, 2001) in IODM to achieve
performativity ideals defined by government programmes. Unlike previous studies of boundary spanners in public
sector accounting (Abernethy et al., 2004; Anderson & Dekker, 2014), in this paper we propose that boundary span-
ners are not always an apparent and easily identifiable group of actors. A number of studies in public sector manage-
ment indicated that boundary spanners have varied roles and responsibilities. For example, Qureshi, Sutter, and Bhatt
(2018) showed how influential boundary spanners could be in the social context of extreme poverty and inequality.
Their study also showed that various types of boundary spanners were involved inmaking changes and not all of them
had to have formal roles. In earlier studies,Williams (2002, 2013)mentioned that dedicated boundary spanners often
lack the formal status of manager and leaders. He also mentioned that sufficient commitment and understanding of
mainstream managers are essential for inter-organisational work to take place. To contribute to this discussion, we
propose to group boundary spanners as formal and semi-formal with respect to the empirical data and participants of
our study. In other empirical settings, boundary spanners could be categorized differently. Future studies could look
at the composition of boundary spanners more carefully and work on potential parameters to detect possible catego-
rization of boundary spanners.
In accounting literature, although previous studies highlighted the selection and appointment of boundary span-
ners as part of a formal control process of the organisation, they did not explain in detail the work of boundary
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spanners who are not formally appointed to their role. When facing difficulties in a large organisation such as the
NHS, local teamsmight need to interact and communicate for decision-making. In these situations, certain individuals
acted as semi-formal boundary spanners and contributed significantly to IODM. Unless these IODM situations were
observed and analysed, it could have been easy to miss that these boundary spanners existed and they had an active
role in decision-making.Williams (2013) suggested that it was essential formainstreammanagers to support thework
of dedicated boundary spanners in public sector management. Our study shows that semi-formal boundary spanners
had the power and resources tomake inter-organisational decisions without direct involvement or approval of formal
boundary spanners. Together with this, it is essential to note that decisions of these semi-formal boundary spanners
were ultimately in line with performativity ideals of relevant government programmes.
On the other hand, despite attempts at policy documents and formal recruitment channels, it was not always possi-
ble to appoint formal boundary spanners in a standardisedway. For example, local commissioning committeemembers
were not recruited in the same fashion according to the committees that wewere able to reach. Furthermore, theway
new clinical professionals were appointed to these committees as new formal boundary spanners was not consistent.
Some of these newly appointed formal boundary spanners found it difficult to fit in these roles and contribute to the
decision-making process, in particular when they hadmultiple roles in relation to commissioning. They then distanced
themselves from these committees. Compared to previous studies of NHS commissioning (Chambers et al., 2013), this
study contributed by highlighting the differences between formally appointed boundary spanners and semi-formal
boundary spanners and the various ways they participated in IODM for commissioning.
Second, the study introduced the concept of ‘reciprocity’ (Miller, 1990, 2001) to studies of IODM. The evidence
showed that reciprocity between calculative practices and the aims of IODM is an important aspect that is worth
studying further. Analysis of policy documents in this study indicated that there was an apparent lack of reciprocity
(or limited reciprocity) between calculative practices and performativity ideals of government programmes. Field-
work data provided further evidence that the lack of reciprocity is likely to cause problems between organisations and
result in a lack of standard practices when boundary spanners interact with calculative practices for decision-making.
This particular finding is interesting within the context of performativework conceptualisation of Buenza and Ferraro
(2019). According to their definition of performative work, calculative devices are structures that constrain action.
Performative work aims at ensuring the circulation of these calculative devices.What the concept of reciprocity does
as an addition to this conceptualisation is to question whether particular calculative devices do in fact exist to achieve
the ideals of performativity projects. For that reason, reciprocity provides a point of inquiry to search for appropriate
calculative practices that are adequate to meet the performativity ideals. It provides a prior state to study performa-
tive work, and how it evolves in situations where there is no clear calculative device dedicated for the performativity
project at hand.
In relation to how the two groups of boundary spanners interacted with calculative practices, the evidence indi-
cated significant differences. In central and regional committees, formal boundary spanners used calculative prac-
tices to communicate and share information mainly for reconciliation purposes of their financial position. These for-
mal boundary spanners mentioned difficulties of meeting performance aims. They also agreed that local teams were
facing a number of challenges in commissioning agreements, but as central representatives, they were not in a posi-
tion to suggest alternative calculative practices. Instead, these centrally located formal boundary spanners referred to
both financial accounting rules (about the calculation of fund allocations toCCGs and centrally expected savings every
financial year) as well as non-financial performance targets (maintaining care quality standards and delivering higher
volumes of activity for hospitals) to reinforce clear boundaries between providers and purchasers.
In local teams, however, semi-formal boundary spanners invested time and effort to resolve various practical prob-
lems that arose as a consequence of payments that their organisations received from the centre. Hospitals as themain
service providers of NHS appeared as either not receiving or receiving delayed and reduced payments from CCGs
as purchasers. Despite provider attempts in meetings to show that this situation was causing them to not be able to
make proper long-term plans as well as result in increased deficits (which in turn threatened the future of certain
services), CCG boundary spanners brought additional non-financial information (such as public health needs, waiting
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time targets, etc.) to make their case in order to suggest alternative calculative practices. These semi-formal bound-
ary spanners from CCGs were skilful at using calculative practices of financial and managerial accounting together
with additional non-accounting data in building their argument andmaking their suggestions accepted by other semi-
formal boundary spanners. This conclusion helped us to contribute to theoretical issues as explained in the next
section.
This study has managerial and policy implications. First, it indicates that micro-relations between boundary span-
ners are influential in IODM. Not only formal but a number of semi-formal boundary spanners are involved in these
IODM scenarios. It is essential that policymakers are aware of the role and influence of these individuals in IODM. It
could be possible to reach, communicate and train these individuals so that a more coherent approach could be fol-
lowed in IODM. Second, this study indicates that for policymakers to achieve the performance aims of government
programmes, it is essential that an appropriate set of accounting technologies are in place. A lack of this has far reach-
ing implications. Even in our relatively limited sample, it was evident that lack of appropriate accounting technologies
caused problems in IODM. This resulted in amultiplicity of substitute practices devised by various semi-formal bound-
ary spanners.
7.1 Theoretical implications
The first theoretical implication is about the concept of boundary and how it is defined. We use conceptualisations of
Llewellyn (1994) to explain how the interaction between boundary spanners and calculative practices contribute to
the definition of boundaries in inter-organisational spaces. The second aspect of our theoretical discussion is about
micro-foundations of performativity debate (Beunza & Ferraro, 2019), and how performative actions of actors evolve
in situations where there is no particular performative device tomeet the desired aims of performativity projects.
According to the study findings, the way some representatives were influential as semi-formal boundary spanners
had implications on how boundaries between CCGs and hospitals were influenced. Semi-formal boundary spanners
were able to orchestrate both their own organisation’s accounting technologies and the technologies that hospital
representatives were using, together with other non-accounting data that affected the service provision of CCGs and
providers. Their actionsdemonstrated that theywere able to represent interests of not only their organisationbut also
the interests of other organisations that they were in IODM scenarios. In building their argument, these individuals
used government programmes and centrally determined rules and aims as the ultimate performativity aims. We con-
clude that their actions primarily aimed at adhering to the financial constraints and non-financial performance aims of
these programmes. In addition to this, they prioritized the health needs of the population together with performance
targets of hospitals, in particular quality and cost targets – in this instance satisfactory A&E waiting times and costs
when suggesting alternative calculative practices.With this finding, we therefore contribute towards Llewellyn’s defi-
nition of boundaries by emphasising the role of semi-formal boundary spanners.With the use of accounting technolo-
gies in local decision-making teams, semi-formal boundary spanners represented not only the interests of their organ-
isation but also broader interests of the public as well as the interests of the organisations that they were working for.
Furthermore, we provide evidence that these boundary spanners used other supplementary information intensely
in local decision-making situations. We therefore propose that the use of non-accounting information together with
calculative practices helps semi-formal boundary spanners to make their case. This was evident as CCG boundary
spanners were effective in influencing boundary spanners from hospitals to agree with them. We suggest that calcu-
lative practices (financial and non-financial) are strong tools capable of redefining boundaries between organisations
when influential boundary spanners use them tomeet the performativity ideals of government programmes.
In our data analysis, the search for reciprocity enabled us to show the lack of specific calculative practices to reach
performativity ideals of government programmes studied. This finding helped us to reflect on what boundary span-
ners do in this situation. We concluded that formal and semi-formal boundary spanners interacted differently with
calculative practices as explained above.What is interesting to note here is that semi-formal boundary spanners were
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able to devise different and numerous alternative calculative practices. Moreover, they were able to offer new inter-
pretations and influence other semi-formal boundary spanners in order to reach an inter-organisational decision. It is
therefore possible to suggest that these semi-formal boundary spanners were dispersed around the periphery of the
organisation rather than centrally located as formal boundary spanners. These semi-formal boundary spanners were
active contributors to IODM and designing of calculative practices. This finding is in line with the performative work
definitions of Buenza and Ferraro (2019) where certain peripheral actors who are not central high level managers
assume catalysing actions across different fields of activity.
Our emphasis on reciprocity of calculative practices and government programmes offers an opportunity to further
our understanding of performative work in relation to this type of boundary spanners. These peripheral boundary
spanners skillfully orchestrate financial and non-financial performance measures in designing alternative calculative
practices. Semi-formal boundary spanners in our study were the catalysts of new calculative practices which contin-
ued to turn individuals into calculable objects (Kurunmaki et al., 2016). It is important to emphasise that our data are
collected in apublic sector setting and itwas imperative todeliver the service –henceboundary spannerswereobliged
to reach a decision. This makes our case significantly different than studies conducted in private sector settings (e.g.
Beunza and Ferraro, 2019) where actors might decide not to go ahead with a particular programme and/or not to use
a particular calculative device.
8 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our account contributed to IODM studies in three ways. First, it showed that calculative practices help
and at times hinder boundary spanners depending on their role and responsibilities in particular situations of IODM.
Reciprocity is an important concept to consider in these situations to see to what extent calculative practices that are
used by boundary spanners are adequate to implement centrally defined performativity ideals. Our study showed that
when they are not adequate then this lack could become a cause of conflict, tension and disagreement in IODM. This
contribution adds a newdimension to studies of conflict between public sector organisations. This tension then causes
some semi-formal boundary spanners to devise alternative calculative practices. Althoughnot favouredbyother semi-
formal boundary spanners, these alternative practices are ultimately implemented, causing inter-organisational deci-
sions to be one sided. In these situations, therefore, calculative practices help certain boundary spanners to meet
performativity ideals of government programmes and hinder other boundary spanners to meet their organisation’s
practices, performance and plans.
Our research methodology has the usual limitations of qualitative research and case-based design together with
researcher and interviewee bias.We aimed to address those limitations through triangulation and use ofmultiple data
sources. We hope that the new concepts we introduced such as formal and semi-formal boundary spanners and reci-
procity between calculative practices and programmes influencing IODMwill help advance research in this literature.
Furthermore, we propose that study of micro-relations of IODM between boundary spanners have the potential to
contribute to performativity studies. Boundary spanners as calculable objects are both strong and fragile when they
interact with calculative practices. They are usually governed by calculative practices (Kurunmaki et al., 2016) and in
situations when they are expected to find alternative calculative practices then these calculable objects are governed
by ultimate performativity ideals of government programmes.
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